| Preston
V.
The Republic of Krameria | Case No. SC-CV-13 | | --- | --- |
Opinion delivered from the Court of Justice Roltech Freland;
In the matter of Preston V. The Republic, the petitioner, Mr. Preston, argued that Title II, Section 1, Clause 3 of the Republic Electoral Act of March, 2026 (hereafter “REA”) was unconstitutional, on the basis that it expanded Congress’s impeachment authority beyond that which is enumerated. After an unwarranted delay, the Republic eventually motioned for summary judgment, declaring their agreement with the petitioner. Opposition to the petitioner came in the form of an amicus brief, submitted by Amicus Curiae Foog.
In this case, the Court has considered the perspectives of all parties in the matter at hand. However, a verdict must be reached. Although this ruling will cover a range of questions raised during the trial, the verdict will ultimately favor the petitioner’s sought course of action.
This Ruling of First Instance finds Title II, Section 1, Clause 3 of REA in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Krameria.
As a result, because a Justice acting in the capacity of “an inferior court” (Article 38) has deemed the “statute” (Article 38) at hand “structurally repugnant to the Constitution” (Article 38), this matter will “be delivered immediately to the [full] Supreme Court” (Article 38), so that “the majority of the Supreme Court” (Article 38) can produce a final answer to the Constitutional questions at hand.
In their amicus brief, the third party opposition alleged that the case was “unripe”, meaning “the precise constitutional issue cannot be fully assessed until [101.2(b) of REA] is actually invoked” and that application “only becomes a live dispute the moment someone attempts to impeach a KEB director.” In other words, the amicus curiae seems to be suggesting that judicial review only takes hold when an unconstitutional provision is actually enforced; not by simply being enacted.
To address this claim, let us turn to what the Constitution states about judicial review. According to Article 38, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution, “Laws contrary to [the Articles of the Constitution] shall be struck down by the majority of the Supreme Court”. This provision does not indicate “enforced laws” and it does not indicate “tangible instances”. It simply says “Laws.” As a result, even if the provisions of a law have not been made tangible, a law must nonetheless be subject to judicial review, should its written provisions be “repugnant” to the Constitution of the Republic of Krameria. Writing alone is enough to produce a court ruling.
As a result, this ruling will comment on the statute at hand. And because the statute in question is being declared “repugnant to the Constitution”, the matter will go to “the majority of the Supreme Court”.
In this case, there is an issue which neither the petitioner nor opposing amicus curiae addressed in their initial briefs. And yet, this issue is fundamental to producing a verdict for either side. This is the question: “What is Impeachment”? In order to recognize whether or not a procedure is Constitutional, we must first understand what it is. Otherwise, we are just providing that a gibberish term is unconstitutional, without actually saying anything of substance.
Because it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial institution to acknowledge what the law is, this Court will provide a definition for what we mean when we say “Impeachment”. Because the Constitution of the Republic of Krameria is written in English, the Court will use a reputable English dictionary to define its unclarified text. In doing so, the Court finds that Definition D provided by Merriam Webster Dictionary best suits how the Constitution uses the word in Article 27. This definition reads: “a calling to account for some high crime or offense before a competent tribunal…especially the arraignment (as of a public official) for misconduct while in office”. Although one could argue that Definition C is also fitting, the Court finds Definition D to be more applicable, given that it explicitly references “public official[s]” and “a competent tribunal” (as is the Supreme Court, in Article 27’s impeachment trials). As a result, the Court will exclusively use this definition to define the legal term “Impeachment”.
In this definition, the key definitional terms which will decide this case are “high crime” and “offense”. In other words, by “impeaching” an official, Congress is levying a criminal prosecution against them. The transitive verb “impeach” also accompanies its noun-based counterpart, being defined explicitly (by Definition 1 provided by Merriam Webster Dictionary) as “to charge with a crime or misdemeanor”.
Although the petitioner denied that impeachment was synonymous with “criminal prosecution”, the Court fails to see how the Constitution could reference any other definition. Impeached officials are placed before a court of law (the Supreme Court) and renowned dictionaries explicitly define impeachment as relating to criminal charges. Alongside this, contrary to the claims of the petitioner, even the real world system Kramerian impeachment takes from (the Constitution of the real world United States) provides that “Impeachment” is “for…high Crimes and Misdemeanors”.
Simply put, an “Impeachment” is the Congressional prosecution of a government official. The most reasonable English dictionary definitions provide for this, as does the structure of Impeachment trials.
A key dispute in this case was the matter of Article 27(m), which provides Congress with the capacity to “Make laws that shall be necessary and proper for the execution of [Congress’s] foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by these articles in the government of the Republic of Krameria.” The petitioner argued that because Impeachment is an independent provision established by the Constitution itself, rather than a procedure created by Congress, expanding it cannot be part of this “necessary and proper” clause. The opposing amicus curiae, meanwhile, argued that because the ability to create an institution entails the ability to regulate that institution, the ability to prescribe impeachment for statutory positions does fall under Article 27(m).
Indeed, no party in the case disputed that the ability to create extended to the ability of regulation or removal. The petitioner even stated that “a congressional removal vote over [a] KEB Director does not exceed enumeration” and that “Defining [that] an office Congress created may be undone by Congress is ordinary legislative housekeeping”. With this, the dispute is not whether Congress has the power to remove KEB Directors, or to prescribe a removal process. Rather, the dispute is whether impeachment is something Congress can extend, as a means of instituting this removal process.