| Preston

V.

Republic of Krameria | Case No. SC/ | | --- | --- |

Brief in support of Respondent, the Republic.

INTRODUCTION

To begin, let us review the aw that is challenged: Directors of the KEB shall be subject to impeachment using the same method as any other government official. (6 K.C.C. §101.2(b)). Petitioner, Preston, alleges that this provision is unconstitutional, since the Constitution does not prescribe a general impeachment procedure. Amicus agrees with Petitioner that 101.2(b) is a deficient provision, but also that Petitioner’s reasoning is faulty, and mistaken on two reasons. The first reason is that Congress’ power to create an office necessarily also implies the power to regulate it, rendering 101.2(b) a valid exercise of the powers of Congress. Second, this matter is conditionally unripe, as even a ruling adverse to 101.2(b) would not prevent Congress from legislating a proper removal procedure for KEB Directors, and no such proceeding has been initiated nor threatened.

  1. Congress’ Power to Create Implies Power to Regulate

The Kramerian Election Bureau is a creature of statute, as Congress willed them into existence through law. Article 27 gives Congress the power to make laws “necessary and proper for the execution of the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by these articles in the government of the Republic of Krameria.” The creation of the KEB falls exactly in this spectrum, as Congress created it, and retains the authority to regulate them.

Petitioner argues that impeachment is not a valid power under the necessary and proper clause. The Constitution offers 2 specific procedures for 2 offices established by the Constitution. The KEB are statutory offices, not constitutional. It follows that the necessary and proper clause fills this gap for creatures of statute.

To hold that Congress may create an office, but is unable to prescribe a removal procedure for it would be no less than absurd. If Congress may create an office, but cannot constitutionally regulate the impeachment of officials from such office, KEB directors, as well as other creatures of statute would be beyond accountability. 101.2(b) is Congress’ attempt to provide that accountability, through the necessary and proper clause.

  1. The Matter is Unripe

No impeachment proceeding against any KEB director has been initiated or threatened. The Court is being asked to rule on a complete hypothetical. No controversy exists out of the statute itself.

Moreover, should the Court reject the 1st reason challenging ripeness, another reason for challenging ripeness here is conditional on Point I. Should the Court find in favor of the Respondent on the Constitutional question, this matter is unripe entirely. Should the Court find against the Respondent, the precise constitutional issue cannot be fully assessed until 101.2(b) is actually invoked. The provision references “the same method as any other government official,” but how that applies only becomes a live dispute the moment someone attempts to impeach a KEB director. That moment has not arrived, and until it does, the Court is being asked to rule on a speculative matter.

If it may please the Court,

Foog